By Sidiki Fofana
Barely three days after former Liberian President George Manneh Weah subtly suggested he was retiring from active politics—declaring during a packed Sunday service at his Forky Klon Church, “I am not going to be like some people who are old and still running behind President Job”—his long-time confidant and Chief of Staff, Eugene Lenn Nagbe, reignited a national debate.
Speaking in his signature husky tone, Nagbe firmly declared, “It would be a joke—an illusion—for anyone to think that the former President’s political life is over. Former President Weah will be on the ballot in 2029.”
This proclamation from Nagbe—known as “Kabongo” among close allies—electrified the Congress for Democratic Change (CDC) base. For many cdcians, the idea of Weah’s return is not just realistic; it’s redemptive. In fact, some insiders say Weah now believes more in this comeback than he did during any of his previous presidential runs.
That mindset became clear in a leaked private exchange between Weah and Hon. Saah Joseph, a Senior Senator on the Party ticket. After Joseph advised Weah to engage Vice President Jeremiah Koung with more tact, Weah reportedly fired back: “Saah, keep making big mouth—you will see 2029.” A telling message. Weah is not stepping aside—he’s reloading.
But that raises a fundamental question: Is Weah’s comeback a national desire—or merely a party-crafted illusion meant to keep the CDC orbiting around his cult of personality?
A Case for National Desire
While Eugene Nagbe may have ignited the flames, it’s arguably the Boakai administration that has fueled it— keeping the Weah ” come back” flames alive whether intentionally or not.
Since taking office, President Joseph Boakai has governed with what many perceive as a tone of political vengeance. His administration began by targeting Weah and civil servants thought to be loyal to him. Tenure laws were dismantled. Appointees were purged. A promised war on corruption quickly began to look like a campaign against Weah-era officials—namely, former Minister of State Nathaniel Mcgill, Finance Minister Samuel D. Tweah and Chief of Protocol Finda Bundoo amongst many others.
The Governor of the Central Bank was booted – out, and his Deputy Governor made to resign, though both had months, if not a year remaining in their tenure .
Yet, members of Boakai’s own circle have been implicated in scandal, including a $500,000 controversy involving the National Social Security Corporation and the Minister of State. Eight million dollars reportedly paid by the Central Bank under dubious circumstances with Boakai’s approval , to a bank believed to have fund the his campaign.
Then came the Yellow Machines Saga—a multi-million-dollar procurement of earth-moving equipment that allegedly violated basic public procurement rules and stoked public outrage. Public trust was fast eroding in Boakai – a man believed not only to be honest but has many years of experience.
Worsening economic conditions further deepened disillusionment. Commodity prices soared. Job security vanished for thousands of civil servants. Corruption was given a center seat , Chaos and uncertainty became daily realities. And for some Liberians, the contrast became undeniable as even critics of Weah began murmuring, “Even Weah didn’t do this.”
Chaos and Confusion: A Presidency Off Course
Discontent isn’t just external. Boakai’s Unity Party is visibly cracking. Protesters have gathered at the President’s residence and party headquarters. The late Senator Prince Johnson—once considered a kingmaker in Boakai’s victory—was caught on tape saying, “Boakai doesn’t answer my calls anymore.”
Liberians are witnessing a government bogged down in endless drama. When protesters were fatally shot by police in Kingjor, Grand Cape Mount County, the capital building—Liberia’s democratic symbol—was simultaneously engulfed in flames.
Even more destabilizing was a prolonged political impasse in the House of Representatives, allegedly orchestrated by Boakai and carried out by his Vice President. The open defiance of a Supreme Court ruling in favor of Speaker Fonati Koffa exposed the administration’s disregard for judicial authority—and worsened the country’s institutional fragility.
All of this chaos seems to vindicate Nagbe’s early warning: “Weah is coming back.” A sentiment echoed by Musa H. Bility, political leader of the Citizen Movement for Change (CMC), who told Spoon TV: “If elections were held today, Weah would win.”
National Reassessment—or Party Daydream?
To be clear, George Weah’s presidency was far from perfect. His administration was widely criticized for corruption, poor governance, and economic mismanagement. But the glaring contrast with Boakai’s missteps has made CDC’s comeback narrative more compelling and believable especially to its base .
For many Liberians, this is not just about Weah—it’s about the erosion of hope under a government that promised better.
The idea of Weah returning in 2029 has become more than a rallying cry. It’s a potential reality. Whether the broader Liberian public sees this as salvation—or regression—remains the central question.
The Cracks Beneath the Comeback: Weah’s Path Back to Power
The idea of a George Weah political comeback in 2029 is no longer a whisper—it is becoming a rallying cry among grassroots members of the Coalition for Democratic Change (CDC). As the largest opposition party, the CDC remains a formidable force. But after twenty years of existence, questions loom large: is the CDC still intact enough to carry Weah back to the Executive Mansion? And more critically, can he still unify a movement that once defined Liberian political energy?
Critics of the “Weah comeback” argument acknowledge the party’s historical strength but warn that the CDC is no longer the machine it once was. “The party is a reflection of its glorious days,” said a former organizing member who has since joined President Boakai’s “rescue train.” His comments echo a sentiment heard across Liberia: the cracks in the CDC are widening.
The most visible rupture came when the party’s most charismatic chairman Mulbah K. Morlu—affectionately known as “Doctore”—resigned after a prolonged dispute with Weah. With over two decades of service, his exit was more than symbolic; it was a blow to the morale of the party’s core organizers.
Another high-profile departure is that of Thomas Fallah, once a CDC cadre who rose to become a political “general” and the current Deputy Speaker of the House of Representatives. Fallah was instrumental in the party’s historic 2023 showing in Lofa County—President Boakai’s stronghold—where the CDC achieved over a record 30% of the vote, up from its previous ceiling of just 7%. Now, even Fallah is no longer in the fold.
But the CDC’s internal fractures are not just about elite defections. Disillusionment runs deep among its rank-and-file. Many longtime supporters, who worked tirelessly for Weah in 2017, now question whether their sacrifices were worth it. “Should we again put in our all, only for Weah to empower only his friends?” asked Manja Varney, a revolutionary gladiator per CDC’s standard . This sense of betrayal lingers, especially among those who were excluded from meaningful or any roles during Weah’s presidency.
Even more concerning is the deafening silence from Weah’s former officials who he had favored over original party faithfuls to serve in his administration. With the exception of a very few of Weah’s formal officials who have openly embraced his return, the buck of them remain uninterested. Silent. Former Vice President Jewel Howard Taylor, speaking on Spoon TV, called for a united opposition—but stopped short of endorsing Weah. “We will then decide who the arrowhead will be,” she said, hinting at internal deliberations within the opposition.
Senator Nathaniel McGill, Weah’s former Minister of State and one of the presumed pillars of support for a Weah ” come- back ” , echoed similar ambiguity. Speaking at an opposition rally following the Boakai administration’s defiance of a Supreme Court ruling, he declared, “In 2029, the opposition will come together and then decide who will lead them.”
In short, Weah’s comeback is no longer a top-down movement. It is being willed from below, by regular CDCians—many of whom never tasted the fruits of governance. For them, a second Weah term is a second chance. “We will do everything for Weah to come back,” said Mayango Jallah, the chairman of the party’s auxiliary structure . “But if similar acts of marginalization happen again, we will be the first to turn on our own government.”
This is the fundamental tension of the “Weah 2029” project. Can he offer both redemption to the disillusioned and a new vision for the country? Or will he rely on the fervent—but fragile—devotion of the “Weahcians,” whose loyalty to him , resembling sycophancy , often disregards political strategy and critical reflection? Ironically, some of these most self- proclaim loyalists ( Weachians)have become his harshest critics when their expectations are not met.
The case of George Solo, former CDC chairman, is illustrative. Once a staunch supporter of Weah ; declaring that the sole purpose for the formation of the CDC “was to make Weah President.” Weah determination to make Solo CDC chairman in 2010 , who was not around when the time came “to make Weah President”, helped fracture the party, leading to the birth of the ANC—and later, Solo ” a die- hard ” Weahcians , sadly became one of Weah’s most vocal adversaries.
Still A Chance:
As President Boakai’s administration struggles under the weight of unmet expectations and growing dissatisfaction, the window for a Weah comeback grows wider. But victory in 2029 will require more than popularity. It will demand trust, coalition-building, and political discipline.
To win the nation, Weah must first win back his party—and then the broader opposition. In a political culture where voters often follow those they view as trusted “leaders,” Weah must regain not only the masses but also the confidence of his peers- leaders in different ways.
Can he do it? Or will the comeback remain just a dream whispered in the cracks of a once-mighty movement?
Is George Weah the answer to Liberia’s current disillusionment? Or is the CDC mistaking internal loyalty for a nationwide longing? Conclusion: One thing is clear: Weah is back in the national conversation.
Whether this is a strategic illusion or a grassroots cry for redemption, the former president’s political shadow looms large over Liberia’s future.
The 2029 race has unofficially begun. And the question is no longer whether Weah wants to return—but whether Liberia is ready to receive him.
About Sidiki Fofana: Organization and Leadership Development Expert with years of experience as a leader in Institutional Change Management and Business Development. A trained Cybersecurity Specialist from Saint Joseph University. A long term Grass Roots Political Strategist.
