By George K. Werner (former education minister)
In responding to my earlier reflections about Liberia’s port reforms, former Commerce Minister Axel Addy posed a question that is as practical as it is philosophical: What do our past experiments with decentralization — especially the County Development Fund — actually teach us about devolving authority over strategic national assets like ports? His caution is fair. Decentralization in Liberia has always promised inclusion, but it has also revealed the limits of weak institutions, fragile oversight, and political capture.
To understand where we stand today, it helps to go back to the County Development Fund (CDF). Established in the 2006/07 fiscal year as part of Liberia’s first wave of post-war reforms, the CDF emerged from broader thinking about rebuilding the social contract and reducing chronic centralization.¹ Steve Radelet — then serving as economic adviser to President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, and now the Donald F. McHenry Chair in Global Human Development at Georgetown University — was among those arguing that peace would endure only if Liberians outside Monrovia felt real development in their communities.² The CDF was conceived as one instrument to achieve that.
The initial allocations were modest — about US $60,000 per county. Within a few years, the program expanded to roughly US $200,000 per county annually, adding up to around US $3 million nationwide each year. ³ the intention was simple but ambitious: counties would identify and fund small, high-impact projects — classroom blocks, clinics, feeder roads, markets — through participatory “county sittings.” On paper, the CDF represented a first step toward fiscal decentralization: shift some resources and decision-making away from Monrovia and toward communities historically left behind.
But the fund was introduced into a governance ecosystem still dominated by the center. County superintendents were appointed rather than elected, counties had no independent revenue bases, and ministries in Monrovia retained decisive control over procurement and financial management. ⁴
Over time, audits and independent assessments documented recurring patterns: weak documentation, procurement shortcuts, incomplete or stalled projects, and in some cases appropriations that did not fully reach county accounts.⁵ Even where guidelines created participatory processes, real power often shifted to legislative caucuses and influential county elites, who used their budget leverage and political influence to shape allocations.⁶
The truth is uncomfortable but important: the CDF revealed how decentralized funds can still be centralized in practice when institutions are weak and sanctions for non-compliance are rare.
Yet the picture was not uniformly bleak. In several counties, communities did see tangible benefits — market buildings, school structures, culverts and small roads — and local consultations occasionally improved prioritization. The problem was consistency. Liberia built a mechanism to send money outward, but not the governance scaffolding needed to manage it predictably and transparently.
Axel’s reference to Grand Bassa brings the lesson into sharper relief. The paving of the road to Buchanan, upgrades to the port, and credible investor interest created enormous expectations — from dry ports and special economic zones to tourism and logistics platforms.
But judged by job creation, diversification, and household welfare, Grand Bassa did not transform at the pace many anticipated. The hardware improved; the governance software lagged behind. Studies of county-level development show that physical investments alone rarely produce sustained prosperity without strong institutions to plan, monitor, and ensure local benefit. ⁷
That history matters as Liberia debates whether — and how — to decentralize port management. Buchanan, Greenville, and Harper are not just gateways for cargo; they are potential engines of regional growth. Axel is right to warn that decentralization without guardrails risks mismanagement or opaque deals that undermine public trust. But decades of rigid centralization have also produced delays, politicized decisions, and limited local linkages to development. The lesson from the CDF is not that decentralization is inherently flawed. It is that decentralization fails when authority moves faster than accountability, capacity, and enforcement.
If Liberia proceeds with port reform, the CDF offers several clear lessons. First, roles must be defined in law — with consequences. A national regulator should set standards and protect national interests, while individual ports have operational autonomy tied to measurable performance. Second, authority must be matched with capacity.
Local port boards and managers need trained financial staff, procurement expertise, compliance systems, and independent oversight — not just titles.⁸ Third, transparency must be non-negotiable. Concession terms, port revenues, and performance indicators should be public, and citizen participation should be structured — not ceremonial. And finally, unlike the CDF experience, audits must lead to corrective action, including sanctions where necessary. ⁹
Axel worries that without these guardrails, Liberia could one day awaken to find strategic assets mishandled or effectively transferred without due process. That is a legitimate fear grounded in experience. But the answer is not to retreat into the comfort of old centralization. It is to finish the decentralization project properly — ensuring that when power moves outward, accountability moves with it. Steve Radelet and others were correct that legitimacy cannot be sustained if development remains confined to Monrovia. Our challenge today is to pair that insight with institutional rigor.
So, the real question is not whether Liberia should decentralize. It is whether we have the courage to decentralize with rules, with transparency, and with teeth. If we apply the lessons of the County Development Fund — both its successes and its failures — decentralization of critical assets like ports can become a driver of inclusive growth rather than a repetition of past mistakes.
Building inclusive economic development beyond Monrovia will not happen by accident. It will happen when power, responsibility, and accountability finally travel together — from the capital to the counties — in a way that citizens can see, trust, and benefit from.
For further reading:
- Richards and S. Jallah, “How Liberia’s County Development Fund Works,” Stability: International Journal of Security and Development 3, no. 1 (2014).
Steven Radelet, Emerging Africa: How 17 Countries Are Leading the Way (Washington, DC: Center for Global Development, 2010).
International Monetary Fund, Liberia: Staff Report for the 2012 Article IV Consultation, IMF Country Report No. 12/273 (Washington, DC: IMF, 2012).
Various assessments of CDF/CSDF implementation, including General Auditing Commission reviews (2010–2015).
Reporting and commentary on County Social Development Fund conflicts, The Analyst (Monrovia), various issues.
- Shilue and H. Haavik, “Development, Governance and Local Expectations in Liberia,” NUPI Research Paper, no. 3 (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2024).
IMF governance and public financial management assessments related to sub-national capacity (2010–2020).
Reports of the General Auditing Commission (GAC) and Liberia Anti-Corruption Commission (LACC) on sub-national spending oversight.
