By Festus Poquie
Presidential Press Secretary Kula Bonah Nyei Fofana defended the activities of a self-styled “National Fulani security” organization and urged authorities to pursue registration, training and formal oversight rather than immediate disbandment — even as the government has moved to ban the group.
She described the group as long-standing and event-driven, primarily providing crowd-control and protective services during large religious gatherings such as Ramadan prayers and visits by international clerics.
The Press Secretary cited past instances where the group worked alongside national police to help manage large crowds and prevent stampedes.
“Before judgment, facts must come before fear,” Fofana wrote on her Facebook page, calling for measured responses and legal regulation.
She urged authorities to consider formal registration, clear operational guidelines, non-violent crowd-management training, and integration into community policing initiatives rather than blanket criminalization.
“Guidance is better than rejection,” she wrote, warning that immediate disbandment could alienate young volunteers who help maintain order.
The opinion piece comes after a video of the group circulated online, prompting swift public concern over uniforms, coordination and the potential for parallel security structures.
Officials said the government had outlawed the organization, citing risks to public order. Supporters argue the unit fills gaps where police resources are thin, especially during mass religious events.
Analysts caution that community security outfits can present both benefits and risks. “Volunteers who help manage crowds and protect congregations can be a force for safety when properly regulated,” said a regional security analyst.
“But without oversight and clear limits, such groups can evolve into factional militias or be exploited by political actors.”
The transformation of tribal or religious militia groups into violent extremist or criminal entities is a documented phenomenon in parts of Africa and beyond.
Observers point to several patterns: local self-defence groups emerging in response to insecurity; gradual politicization; competition for resources and territory; and, in some cases, co-option by ideological movements.
Examples frequently cited by experts include the Janjaweed militias in Darfur, which were accused of widespread atrocities in the 200s; armed Islamist movements in the Lake Chad basin such as Boko Haram, which began as an insurgent religious movement and morphed into a lethal terrorist organization; and the Lord’s Resistance Army in central Africa, a rebel force led by a charismatic commander that carried out decades of violence.
In West Africa’s Sahel region, communal self-defence groups formed to protect herders and farmers have in some areas become entangled with jihadist networks or criminal bands, complicating efforts to stabilize localities and restore state authority.
Analysts say weak institutions, porous borders and political grievances make such transformations more likely.
Liberia’s civil wars offer a local case study of how militias and factional armed groups can devastate a country.
Between 1989 and 2003, multiple armed factions — including the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and splinter groups such as ULIMO — fought for control, drawing in youth and using ethnic solidarities to recruit and operate.
The conflict was marked by summary killings, forced displacement and the enlistment of child soldiers. Post-war, demobilization and reintegration programs struggled to neutralize former fighters, and the legacy of fragmented armed groups contributed to persistent instability and criminal networks.
Human rights organizations have consistently documented how wartime militias, once accustomed to unchecked violence, can evolve into organized criminal or terror-affiliated cells if reintegration fails and grievances persist.
Those lessons inform calls from security experts that any non-state security initiative must be tightly regulated, transparent and accountable.
Kula’s appeal to treat the situation as a “teaching moment” echoes that viewpoint: providing a legal framework, oversight and training, she argues, could turn uncertainty into cooperation.
Critics counter that any formal acknowledgment of armed or uniformed groups outside state control risks legitimizing parallel forces and should be avoided.
