By George K. Werner (former education minister)
Years ago, in a canon law class, we debated papal infallibility. The doctrine applies under specific conditions when, as pastor and teacher of all the faithful, he definitively proclaims a doctrine concerning faith or morals. Even within the Catholic Church, infallibility is not a blanket protection for every statement made by its highest authority.
That classroom debate came back to me today, October 12, when I watched the Chief Justice’s remarks carried by FrontPageAfrica. I was immediately appalled by his call to abolish Liberia’s trial jury system.
My objection was to a troubling leap of logic: because juries have been corrupted, the people should surrender their constitutional right to trial by jury.
A high office gives its holder responsibility and influence. It does not make every conclusion sound. Respect for the Chief Justice’s office cannot require silence when he proposes dismantling a protection he should be helping to safeguard.
Trial by jury developed over centuries in England before becoming part of the American constitutional tradition. The Sixth Amendment protects criminal jury trials, while the Seventh preserves jury trials in certain civil cases in federal courts. The institution gives ordinary citizens a role in administering justice and serves as a safeguard against arbitrary power.
Liberia inherited this tradition through its American constitutional foundations. The 1847 Constitution was modeled on the United States Constitution. Article I, Sections 6 and 7, expressly protected trial by jury, including a speedy, public, and impartial jury trial for people facing criminal charges. Our jury system’s constitutional roots therefore reach back to the founding of the republic.
The 1986 Constitution retained that protection. Article 20(a) guarantees trial by jury, subject to its stated exceptions. Article 21(h) protects jury trials in the criminal cases it covers, while allowing an accused person, with appropriate understanding, to expressly waive that right. Jury trial is a constitutional protection belonging to the people.
In the remarks I watched from the opening of the October term, Chief Justice Yamie Quiqui Gbeisay described the jury system as a “bulwark of liberty.” He warned that corruption could turn it from a shield into a sword against justice. After citing instances of jury tampering, he declared: “I hereby call on the Liberian people to abolish the trial jury system.”
The problem he identified is serious. But the incidents he cited do not, by themselves, establish that abolition is necessary.
Evidence that an institution has been corrupted establishes the need to investigate its failures, strengthen its safeguards, and hold wrongdoers accountable. It does not automatically establish that the institution should cease to exist.
We do not abolish government because government officials are corrupt. We demand better government. We strengthen oversight, improve administration, and punish misconduct through lawful processes. Nor would corruption among judges justify abolishing the courts.
Why should corruption involving jurors require citizens to surrender a constitutional right?
Jury tampering can destroy lives. It can deny victims justice, expose innocent people to wrongful convictions, and allow guilty people to escape accountability. Defending trial by jury must never become an excuse for tolerating those abuses.
But the seriousness of the harm does not establish the wisdom of abolition.
The Chief Justice warned of grave consequences “if nothing is done.” I agree that something must be done. Yet our choices are not limited to tolerating corruption or eliminating juries. Between those positions lies the demanding work of reform.
Before asking Liberians to abandon this protection, the Judiciary should explain what has failed. How are jurors selected? Are they adequately prepared, compensated and protected? Are restrictions on outside contact enforced? Who approaches them? Who facilitates improper access? What happens when interference is reported?
A list of disturbing incidents should begin that inquiry. It cannot replace it.
The evidence must also distinguish reported misconduct from proven misconduct. Both deserve attention, but they are not interchangeable.
A persuasive case for abolition requires an account of how widespread the problem is, what remedies have been attempted, why they have failed, and how the proposed alternative would perform better.
There is another danger in condemning the jury system so broadly: it risks casting suspicion on verdicts without evidence that those particular proceedings were compromised.
Proven misconduct in one case cannot establish corruption in another. An acquittal is not proof of bribery. A conviction is not proof of integrity.
Coming from the Chief Justice, such a characterization carries extraordinary weight. It could encourage disappointed litigants to dismiss unfavorable verdicts as corrupt. It could undermine confidence in pending trials and place future jurors under suspicion before they hear a single witness.
It could also create the perception that the Judiciary’s leadership has prejudged the integrity of proceedings that must be assessed individually. That is a concern about the potential effect of his words, not a claim that he has prejudged a particular case.
For defendants, victims, witnesses, and jurors, confidence in an impartial hearing has real consequences. People must be able to enter a courtroom believing that their case will be decided on its evidence, without a presumption that the process is already compromised.
The Chief Justice can condemn jury tampering firmly without casting a cloud over every jury. Each allegation must be examined on its own evidence through the appropriate legal process. A general denunciation cannot substitute for findings in an individual case.
Liberia already has an administrative structure for addressing these weaknesses. The Judiciary’s published description of its Jury Management Office assigns it responsibility for jury selection, organizing the central jury pool, and educating jurors. It states that the National Jury Manager is appointed by the Chief Justice and reports to the Court Administrator.
What does that office need to perform effectively? Where have its safeguards failed? What reforms will its leadership undertake, and how will the public know whether they are working?
A credible reform program would make jury selection more transparent and resistant to manipulation. It would improve juror education, ensure timely and adequate compensation, strengthen protection against threats, and enforce lawful restrictions on outside influence. It would provide a safe way to report attempted interference.
Where laws are inadequate, the responsible institutions should work to strengthen them. Where resources are insufficient, the Judiciary should make the case for adequate funding. Where misconduct is established, accountability must follow through lawful procedures.
That accountability must reach beyond the jury room.
Someone offers the bribe. Someone makes the threat. Someone arranges the contact. Removing jurors while leaving those networks intact may simply redirect the pressure toward whoever decides the case next.
If judges are to assume the jury’s fact-finding role, what evidence shows that concentrating those responsibilities would produce greater integrity? Judges, too, can face money, intimidation, personal loyalties, and political pressure. Every system needs effective safeguards.
In considering reform, we must measure success by fair proceedings and legally sound outcomes, whether conviction or acquittal. Liberia’s Constitution protects the presumption of innocence and requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Those protections matter precisely when public pressure for punishment is strongest.
The Chief Justice is entitled to advocate constitutional change. He called on the people to abolish jury trials; he did not claim to have abolished them himself. Advocating an amendment does not itself violate the Constitution.
But removing this constitutional protection would require the amendment process prescribed by Article 91, including legislative action and a referendum. Until lawfully amended, the existing guarantees must be respected and administered faithfully.
The question is whether he has made a persuasive case for asking the people to surrender them. In the remarks I watched, he did not.
As head of the Judiciary, the Chief Justice should lead the effort to restore confidence in jury trials, working with the Legislature and the Executive Branch where changes in law or funding are necessary. He cannot resolve every weakness alone. But he can lead a credible reform agenda and explain what support it requires.
That responsibility concerns the conditions under which justice is administered. It does not require interference in individual cases.
Calling for abolition without demonstrating why meaningful reform cannot succeed risks becoming a retreat from that responsibility. It asks citizens to bear the cost of institutional failure by giving up a right.
Our American inheritance does not place the jury system beyond criticism. Its long history does not exempt it from change. But those proposing to remove a constitutional safeguard should demonstrate that their alternative would better protect justice and liberty. The incidents cited do not establish that case.
That old canon law debate reminds me that authority and correctness are different things. The Chief Justice’s office deserves respect. His reasoning deserves scrutiny.
A guardian of a constitutional right should make the strongest possible effort to protect it before asking the people to surrender it.
Don’t throw out the baby with the bathwater, Mr. Chief Justice. Confront those who corrupt the system. Lead the reforms. Protect the right.
