By George Werner (former Education Minister)
Dear Class,
We will have our regular session this afternoon but let me pause for a moment because something hot is burning in the national news cycle.
On the night of December 8, 2025, I followed SPOON TV’s popular talk show as the panel dissected the performance of Liberia’s state-owned enterprises. It was a lively discussion—sharp, emotional, and reflective of the everyday frustrations of Liberians. The commentators credited the Liberia Water and Sewer Corporation (LWSC) for recent improvements, and they acknowledged some progress at the Liberia Electricity Corporation (LEC).
As I watched and listened, a reality check stepped in for me: the real test of any LEC management team is the dry season, not the rainy season.
When the turbines grow thirsty, when reservoirs shrink, when demand surges and the hydro cannot meet it—that is when leadership at LEC is exposed.
Yet while some SOEs received praise and others criticism, one larger truth stood unspoken: we have built a state that owns nearly everything and delivers too little. Across successive governments, Liberia has accumulated a sprawling network of state-owned enterprises that touch almost every aspect of our national life—electricity, water, ports, fuel, social security, aviation, forests, petroleum, broadcasting, telecommunications. Our economy breathes through these institutions. And when they falter, Liberia falters.
What Spoon TV discussed in two heated hours is part of a much deeper and older national story. Most of our major SOEs were established during the modernization drive of the late 1960s and 1970s. Tubman created the National Port Authority in 1967. Tolbert created LWSC, LEC, the telecommunications corporation, the broadcasting system, NASSCORP, the FDA, and the LPRC between 1973 and 1978.
These were not accidental institutions—they were designed to anchor infrastructure, manage natural resources, diversify the economy, and move Liberia into the modern age. Two decades later, Charles Taylor added NOCAL in 2000. Under Ellen Johnson Sirleaf came the Liberia Airport Authority in 2009 and major aviation reforms. Each administration added to the architecture—but very few modernized the foundations.
Today we have about 46 SOEs, but only a handful are healthy. Many do not publish audited financials. Many cannot meet payroll without intervention. Many operate without strong boards, or with boards that serve politics rather than performance. And nearly all demand more from the national budget than they contribute. The IMF and the Bureau of State-Owned Enterprises have repeatedly warned that SOEs pose serious fiscal risks due to opaque borrowing, operational losses, and unfunded liabilities.
What the Spoon TV panel captured—perhaps without meaning to—is a national truth: Liberia has allowed SOEs to become symbols of state ambition but not instruments of state capability. Yes, LWSC has made strides. Yes, LEC has moments of improvement. But water running in a few neighborhoods and lights staying on during rainy season do not amount to institutional transformation. The real test lies in whether these entities can deliver consistently, affordably, transparently, and sustainably—season after season, administration after administration.
The consequences of weak SOE governance are not academic. They affect the price of food and fuel, the reliability of power, the survival of businesses, the investment decisions of firms, and the confidence of the public. When the National Port Authority underperforms, the cost of imported rice rises.
When LPRC is unstable, fuel prices spike and transport fares cripple households. When FDA fails to enforce the rules, forests shrink and Liberia loses climate finance. When NOCAL collapses, the promise of petroleum becomes a curse of mismanagement rather than a national asset. When NASSCORP wavers, the elderly lose security in their final years.
And yet, state ownership is not inherently flawed. Across Africa, we see SOEs that excel—Ethiopian Airlines, Rwanda’s Development Board, partially privatized banks and utilities in East Africa, and the reformed Eskom now recovering from years of sabotage and mismanagement. The difference is not ideology. It is governance. Successful SOEs have insulated management, clear mandates, professional boards, independent regulation, performance contracts, and transparency. Those that fail are ruled by politics, not principles.
If Liberia is to modernize its economy, we cannot cling to the past while hoping for the future. We must redesign our SOEs for a 21st-century world that rewards efficiency and punishes dysfunction. This means:
(1) professionalizing boards and insisting on merit-based appointments.
(2) enforcing financial discipline, including the publication of audited accounts.
(3) embracing PPPs and private investment in strategic areas; and
(4) redefining mandates so SOEs do not duplicate roles or drain public finances.
Right now, we have SOEs created for a 1970s economy, operating with a 1980s bureaucratic culture, disrupted by the 1990s war, partially revived in the 2000s, and now expected to thrive in the ultra-competitive, digital, climate-driven economy of the 2020s. That equation cannot produce success.
The Spoon TV discussion was a reminder that Liberians still believe SOEs can deliver more—that our ports can be competitive, our electricity reliable, our water safe, our forests protected, our petroleum sector transparent, and our fuel supply stable. It was also a reminder that public patience is not infinite.
